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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GORGOZA, INCORPORATED, 
a corporation; and JAMES 
B. CONKLING and DONNA D. 
CONKLING, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs-
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 14351 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for the claimed 
breach of an alleged contract which the defendant, Utah 
State Road Commission (now Department of Transportation) 
allegedly entered into with appellants and which is supposedly 
incorporated in the Order of Immediate Occupancy of June 7, 
1971. Said Order of Immediate Occupancy was entered in a 
separate eminent domain proceeding wherein the State Road 
Commission condemned approximately eight acres of plain-
tiff fs land for highway use. Plaintiffs also alleged that 
defendant, State Road Commission, created a defective, unsafe 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and dangerous condition of a highway and other public im-
provements causing plaintiff injury. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed by an Order of 
the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr«, Judge, granting defendant, State Road Commis-
sion's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion was granted 
on the grounds that no binding agreement or enforceable con-
tract existed between the parties and that the State had 
not waived its immunity from suits of this kind. (R-133) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the trial court 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since appellant's Statement of Facts contains many self 
serving statements as well as inaccurate and non essential 
items, respondent does not accept said statement as proper 
and will, therefore, set forth its own as follows: 
Immediately prior to June 7, 1971, an action to con-
demn approximately eight acres of land from appellants was 
initiated by respondent in the Third District Court for 
Summit County. Subsequent to the filing of the action ap-
pellant's counsel, Robert F. Orton, was asked to accept ser-
vice by Leland D. Ford, Assistant Attorney General, to en-
-2-
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able the State to advertise the project at a:i early i: -<•>, 
(R. 76) 
A proposed Order of Immediate Occupancy v - sub-
mitted to Mr. Orton by Mr. Ford for review, (R. 80-86) 
Said proposed Order contained the standard routine language 
typical of other Orders of Immediate Occupancy. (R. 106) 
Mr. Orton stated that he wanted some changes in the language 
of the proposed Order and submitted a proposed Order with 
the changes incorporated in it. The changes involved mainly 
an amplification of the recognized obligation of respondent 
to provide access during construction, a requirement to pro-
vide at least three openings in the right-of-way fence and 
a provision calculated. enjoin each of the parties from 
interfering with each other in their respective uses of their 
property. (See R. 87-93 for comparison with R. 80-86) 
Since the proposed language was considered, accepts:-iv 
the proposed Order prepared by Mr. Orton was submitted to 
Judge Maurice Harding who signed i+-, thus making it the Order 
of the Court. 
A contract for construction >t tin: project was awarded 
to W. W. Clyde & Company by respondent on July 1, 19 71. \R. 
59). Construction commenced in August of 1971. By November 
15/ 1971/ the right-of-way fence was constructed across ap-
-3-
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pellant's frontage, three access openings had been left in 
the fence at the locations designated by appellant and a 
paved approach had been constructed from respondent's high-
way across the frontage road to appellants property. Prior 
to the construction of the paved approach, access was afforded 
to appellant's property at all times from the highway. (R. 60) 
During the Fall of 1971, the contractor began construc-
tion of a cattle guard located on the east edge of appellant's 
parking lot. Due to weather limitations in the Fall of 1971, 
this cattle guard was not completed that year and a temporary 
ky Pass was constructed. (R. 60) 
Appellant contacted Governor Rampton and complained 
about problems with access on or about September 24, 1971? 
(R. 21) It is alleged by appellant that this was for "emer-
gency aid." (Appellant's Statement of Facts, Page 5) It 
is a fact that no attempt was made by appellant or his counsel 
to contact counsel for respondent prior to this so called 
"emergency." On September 28, 1971, a meeting was held with 
Blaine J. Kay, Director of Transportation and other officials 
of the respondent, State Road Commission. (R. 21, 41-45) 
Subsequent to the September 28, 1971, meeting an ac-
cess was constructed to appellant's "middle entrance" as 
requested. (R* 48) This did not satisfy appellant apparent-
-4-
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ly and subsequent to another Complaint by appellant, Conkling 
to Mr. Kay on November 2, 1971, (R. 50) Mr. Kay directed on 
November 10, 1971, that the access be paved. (R. 51) This 
was accomplished November 15, 1971. (R. 60) 
Gorgoza elected not to open for its winter operation 
in 1971. (R. 52) In the summer of 1972, the "frontage road" 
in front of appellant1s property was completed and paved and 
approaches constructed through the right-of-way line to ap-
pellant's parking lot. (R. 60-61) 
Appellants alleged that liability insurance was can-
celled on November 11, 1971, since they were not ready for 
inspection due to the access problem. (R. 22) This is dis-
puted and respondent's allege that access was only one of 
many problems leading to cancellation of liability insurance 
coverage, none of which were the fault of respondent. (R. 61) 
The fact is that the access problem, if indeed it ever was a 
problem, was corrected November 15, 1971. 
No notice was ever received from appellant subsequent 
to November 15, 1971, concerning an intention or desire to 
re-open the resort by respondent and it remains closed to 
this date. 
A letter dated July 21, 1972, (R. 21-23) was sent by 
appellant's counsel, Robert F. Orton, to respondent's attorney, 
Leland D. Ford, which alleged violation of the Order of Im-
-5-
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mediate Occupancy. However, it was October 24, 1972, be-
fore an Order to Show Cause was issued concerning the al-
leged violation by respondent of the provisions of the 
Order of Immediate Occupancy* (Re 94, 95) Since the 
condemnation trial was imminent at that time and it was 
thought that a settlement could be reached of all outstand-
ing issues, a stipulation was entered into on October 27th 
providing that the matter of damages for the alleged breach 
could be heard at a later date. (R. 96, 97) 
Subsequently, on or about November 6, 1972, a stipula-
tion was reached which partially settled the condemnation 
suit between the parties„ (R. 78) Said stipulation provided, 
among other things for a reservation of any rights to claim 
additional compensation arising out of the alleged violation 
by respondent of the Order of Occupancy. 
Appellants brought suit against respondent on February 
8, 1974, in this matter. (R. 1) 
The parties subsequent to discovery filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment on the issue of whether the Order of Occu-
pancy on June 7, 1971, constituted a valid contractual ob-
ligation binding on the State of Utah. (R. 119-120; 128-129) 
The Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., after adopting 
the parties stipulated facts granted the respondent, State 
-6-
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Road Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment, The court 
further dismissed plaintiff's entire Complaint, including 
the negligence count with prejudice and plaintiff has now 
appealed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURTS RULING WHICH DISMISSED PLAINTIFFfS COMPLAINT 
IS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
Each of the parties submitted Motions for Summary Judg-
ment prior to trial based on the question of whether a con-
tract existed between the parties arising out of the Order 
of Immediate Occupancy of June 7, 1971, and events leading 
to its entry. The court ruled on this point in favor of 
respondent, Road Commission, and ordered Judgment of Dis-
missal against appellants. Respondent submits this Judg-
ment is correct and that same should be sustained. 
A. THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO BIND THE STATE ROAD 
COMMISSION TO AN AGREEMENT NOT OTHERWISE BINDING 
IS CORRECT. 
Appellants theory that the negotiating of the terms of 
the Order of Occupancy of June 7, 1971, created a binding con-
tract, the breach of which gives rise to an action for damages 
was rejected by the court below. The main reason for the re-
-7-
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jection of this theory was the holding of the court in 
the case of State Road Commission v. Bates, 20 U.2d 175, 
435 P.2d 417. This case was an action by the State to 
condemn land for a highway* The landowners had prior to 
the action conveyed property to the State by deed and 
alleged that an agent of the State Road Commission prom-
ised them that the State would get water to their remain-
ing land since the non-access fence on the right-of-way 
line cut off their remaining land from the stream where 
stock could water previously. The State denied the allega 
tion but the court arranged for defendants to repay the 
money and litigate that issue. They, in fact, did not do 
so, but the court in commenting about this stated the fol-
lowing: 
' . ' • ' • • • : I I • " - ' 
• • • • • • • . . . . . . . • ...
 v
 . • _
 :
 • • 
Counsel for the landowners 
cite as authority for the valid-
ity of the claimed promise the 
first sentence in Section 254f 
Public Officers, as found in 
43 Am.Jur. 71, but neglected 
to cite other parts in the sec-
tion. So far as material here, 
that section reads: 
When power or jurisdiction 
is delegated to any public of-
l ficer over a subject matter, 
and its exercise is confided 
to his discretion, the acts 
done in the exercise of the 
authority are, in general,. 
-8-
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binding and valid as to the 
subject matter. The only 
questions which can arise 
between an individual and 
the public or any person 
denying their validity, 
are power in the officer 
and fraud in the party. 
* * * An officer can, how-
ever, bind his government 
only by acts which come 
within the just exercise 
of his official powers and 
within the scope of his auth-
ority, unless the government 
held out the officer as having 
authority to do the acts. An 
unauthorized act or declara-
tion of an officer does not 
estop the government from in-
sisting on its invalidity, 
(emphasis supplied) . . . " 
The logical extension of the appellant's argument 
would be to say that any Order of Immediate Occupancy 
creates a "contract" and a breach would give rise to a 
cause of action notwithstanding governmental immunity. For 
instance assume that the language of the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy were decided upon between the landowner or his 
counsel on one hand and the judge on the other, while the 
condemning agency representative remained silent. Does this 
create a contract? If so, who is bound by it? A logical ex-
tension of plaintiff's theory would say that a contract is 
created. The absurdity of plaintiff's argument is obvious 
and should be rejected. Respondent submits that the most 
obvious reason for concluding that there is not an agreement 
-9-
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is that no matter how much negotiating is done over the 
language to be submitted to a court for a proposed Order, 
the court can and frequently does change the language and 
the final result is a "court order/' not an agreement. 
To constitute an agreement to fit appellant's theory 
the respondent supposedly received a benefit of such pro-
portion that it became consideration for an agreement which 
would not otherwise existc What was this "benefit?" Sup-
posedly it was the lack of necessity to serve the defend-
ants with process and the resultant ability to proceed with 
awarding a contract. It is submitted this hardly is a bene-
fit* The contract could have been let with a provision re-
stricting the contractor from working on appellant's prop-
erty until it was obtained at a later time/ so there was 
little,'if any^ benefit. The statute allows service on the 
clerk of the court where the defendants are non-residents 
also. To say this is sufficient to create a contract with 
the resulting burden which appellant urges is really dificult, 
if not down right impossible to accept. 
Most contracts are formed because the parties intended 
to form a contract. There must be present the essentials of 
a contract such as consideration, mutuality, etc. It is usually 
for the mutual benefit of the parties. An analysis of the in-
stant case reveals no apparent intention on the part of re-
-10-
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spondent to "form a contract" and little mutuality. Counsel 
for the State requested appellant's counsel to accept ser-
vice, a request which is not uncommon. Appellant's counsel 
requested modification in the language of the proposed Order 
of Immediate Occupancy, again not an uncommon request. As-
sume that the request of respondent's counsel or of appel-
lant's counsel, either one, occurred without the other, would 
there be an agreement? Does the fact that these independent 
requests were coincidental constitute an agreement? Respondent 
submits that the real question is what did the parties intend? 
Counsel for appellant may have intended this to be a "contract," 
but such was not the intent of respondent's counsel. Nothing 
of the sort was discussed at the time and since respondent's 
counsel cannot intentionally bind the State without authoriza-
tion, it is inconceivable that he can unintentionally bind the 
State as would have to be the case in this instance. 
B. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY CANNOT BE WAIVED BY 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY 
WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. 
This court has recently stated that only the legisla-
ture can waive sovereign immunity. The case of Bailey Ser-
vice & Supply Corp. v. State Road Commission, (1975) 533 
P.2d 882, wherein the court states the following in comment-
ing on the abortive attempt of the State Road Commission to 
waive sovereign immunity in that case: 
-11-
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I I ' . • • • • • ' ' " . . - . : , 
• • • .......... 
Early in the proceedings the 
State Road Commission entered 
into a stipulation with the 
plaintiff which purported to 
waive governmental immunity. 
The stipulation was disavowed, 
and the State defended on the 
ground that the State was im-
mune from suit. Only the legis-
lature can waive sovereign im-
munity and the Road Commissions 
attempt to do so was without 
legal effect. . . . " 
(emphasis supplied} 
If by the simple act of stipulating to alternative 
language in a proposed Order of Immediate Occupancy an 
attorney for the Road Commission (now Department of Trans-
portation) can create a contract binding on that agency 
which has the effect of waiving the cloak of sovereign im-
munity, then it means an agent can do something the parent 
agency cannot do. Add to that the fact the agent did not 
seek or obtain any permission to create a contract and it 
becomes obvious that it is even more difficult to accept 
appellant*s theory that a contract was created. 
The Governmental Immunity Act found in Title 63, 
Chapter 30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and specifically 
Section 63-30-4, makes the act exclusive as to waiver, 
that section reads in part as follows: 
11
. . . wherein immunity from 
suit is waived by this act, 
consent to be sued is granted. 
•t 
-12-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This court has stated in the case of Hansen v, Barlow, 23 
Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 (1969), the following proposition: 
11
. . . the Attorney General, 
in the absence of express legis-
lative restriction to the con-
trary, may exercise all such 
power and authority as the pub-
lic interest may from time to 
time require. In short, the 
Attorney General's powers are 
as broad as the common law unless 
restricted or modified by statute. 
ti 
• • • 
But for the pre-emption of waiver powers which the 
legislature obviously intended when they passed the govern-
mental immunity act, supra, the Attorney General under common-
law powers could presumably have waived governmental immunity. 
It logically follows that since the Attorney General cannot 
directly waive governmental immunity, a waiver cannot be ef-
fected indirectly either. '": 
C. THE ROAD COMMISSION (DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION) 
HAS NOT RATIFIED TEE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BY ITS 
ACTIONS. 
Appellant argues that respondent, State Road Commission, 
has "adopted and ratified" the alleged agreement of the par-
ties entered into on June 7, 1971, when the Order of Occupancy 
was issued by the court. 
Respondent denies most vigorously that its actions in 
response to the Order of Immediate Occupancy amount to a ratifica 
-13-
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tion of an alleged agreement between the parties. The Order 
of Immediate Occupancy required the respondent to provide 
"reasonable access." (R. 5) Respondent's actions were nothing 
more than an attempt to comply faithfully with the Order of 
the Court and to require its contractor to comply as well. 
This is standard practice since those within the Department 
realize the legal consequence of a denial of access. 
The respondent understands the consequences of a fail-
ure to comply with the provisions of an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy. The fact that the taking of or denial of access 
can result in the payment of substantial damages is reason 
enough to justify all of respondent, Road Commission's, actions 
in this case. . -
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that an agreement 
was reached between counsel for the parties, and assuming 
that this was an unauthorized act by an agent of the State in 
line with the Bates case, supra, and further assuming that rat-
ification of this agreement is not (1) required to obtain occu-
pancy of the property and (2) removes a protection against lia-
bility otherwise afforded, is it reasonable to assume that the 
respondent would act to ratify this so called agreement? The 
answer has to be an emphatic, No! On the other hand, would it 
be reasonable to expect the respondent, Road Commission, to re-
act as it did in order to comply with a court order? The answer is 
obviously, yes. 
-14-
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Respondent submits that the actions it took should 
be viewed in the light of what is reasonable. 
One further comment should be made concerning the 
word "agreement." Appellant argues that the "agreement" 
of the parties was admitted in the answer filed by the 
defendant, State Road Commission. The agreement was as 
to language in a proposed order to be submitted to the 
court for review and approval. It is submitted that one 
can agree without making a "contract." The dictionary de-
fines the word agreement as follows: 
" (l)a. The act or fact of agree-
ing; b. harmony of opinion, action 
or character: concord; (2)a. an ar-
rangement as to a course of action; 
b. compact, treaty; (3)a. a contract 
duly executed and legally binding; 
b. the language or instrument embody-
ing such a contract." (Webster1s 
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary) 
The parties obviously attach a different meaning to 
the word "agreement." Appellant construes it as a legally 
binding contract. The respondent construes it as "an arrange-
ment as to a course of action/1 to wit, the proposal of lang-
uage to a court for the creation of and issuance of a court 
order. 
POINT II 
THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE LANGUAGE IN 
A PROPOSED ORDER OF OCCUPANCY DOES NOT CREATE A "CONTRACT" 
AND IN ANY EVENT, CONSIDERATION IS INADEQUATE. 
-15-
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A. THE TERMS OF AN ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY 
ARE ULTIMATELY DECIDED BY THE COURT. 
Plaintiff's contention is that there is a contract 
existing between the parties to provide "reasonable access" 
to plaintiff's property during the course of construction, 
which is supported by the consideration of plaintiffs agree-
ing to proceed with the Order of Occupancy without the neces-
sity of serving all the parties personally, in return for 
the State's agreement to incorporate the suggested language 
of plaintiff which deals with the question of access* Defend-
ant's position is that there cannot be any "contract11 for a 
number of reasons: 
Section 78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states in 
part: 
". . . Upon the filing of 
a petition for immediate oc-
cupancy the court shall fix 
the time within which, and 
the terms upon which, the 
parties in possession shall 
be required to surrender 
possession to the plaintiff* 
it 
• • * - - * -
Nowhere in the statutes dealing with eminent domain, 
is there a legal requirement imposed upon a condemning auth-
ority to provide access. However, the legal affect of deny-
ing access is that the condemning authority must pay damage 
for the diminished value occasioned by the denial of access. 
-16-
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It has been the custom of the Road Commission to seek an 
Order "pendente lite11 authorizing the Road Commission to 
enter into possession of the property while the question 
of damages and/or the value of the taking is reserved for 
a later proceeding. It has become somewhat customary for 
courts to grant these orders of occupancy routinely upon 
the request of the Road Commission and they are seldom con-
tested. The State has a set proposed Order containing stand-
ard language previously used and approved by many state courts 
which is routinely submitted to a court for entry which pro-
vides, among other things, for reasonable access. On numer-
ous occasions, when there are special problems or when counsel 
for defendant landowners request changes, or the court in some 
instances on its own volition elects to, these orders are 
changed as far as the language is concerned in various ways. 
In the case which forms the basis for this suit, a request 
was made by defendant's counsel of plaintiff's counsel to ac-
cept service so that the court could proceed with an immediate 
hearing, obtain an Order of Occupancy and advertise the project 
for bid. The routine Order prepared by the State was submitted 
to plaintiff's counsel for review. Plaintiff's counsel there-
upon submitted the Order incorporating the changes which the 
plaintiff desired. Defendant's counsel reviewed the language 
contained in the proposed Order prepared by plaintiff's counsel 
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and approved the entry of said Order upon stipulation, and 
the court then made it an Order. Defendant does not consider 
that anything was "given up" as far as the language of the 
Order of Occupancy is concerned. The Court simply chose to 
adopt as its Order the agreed language submitted by the par-
ties which amplifies the language already proposed by counsel 
for the State. 
B. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION IN THE 
ALLEGED AGREEMENT OF JUNE l t 1971, TO BIND 
THE STATE IN ANY EVENT. 
The Court found thatf 
11
. . c There was insuf-
ficient consideration in 
the alleged agreement in-
corporated within the Order 
of Occupancy of June 7, 1971f 
to bind the State and thus, 
constitute a contract, in 
any event." (R. 131} 
The consideration which supposedly supports the agree-
ment between the parties is the acceptance of service in the 
eminent domain action by counsel for appellants without the 
necessity of serving the appellants, in return for the al-
leged concession of the respondent in agreeing to modified 
language in the Order of Immediate Occupancy. 
This "consideration" is illusory for at least three 
reasons as follows: (1) Neither parties* acts constituted a 
legal detriment of sufficient proportion to be considered as 
i 
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the equivalent of a legal consideration. The respondent, 
State Road Commission, agreed to modified language in a 
proposed court order not significantly different from that 
proposed originally. (Compare R. 4-6 with R. 24-26). The 
appellant allegedly gave up the right to be served with pro-
cess and allegedly waived objections to the proposed loca-
tion of the new highway. (R. 76). The fact is that counsel 
for respondent requested that counsel for appellant accept 
service of process to enable the hearing on the Order of Im-
mediate Occupancy to proceed. Appellants were never requested 
to "give up the right to contest the location of the highway" 
as appellants assert in their brief. (P. 11) This assertion 
is absolutely untrue and was never the subject of discussion 
between counsel for the parties. The acceptance of service 
and a stipulation to permit an Order of Immediate Occupancy 
to be entered does not waive any rights to contest the loca-
tion of the highway. It is true that when the appellant later 
withdrew the money deposited with the clerk pursuant to statute, 
the appellant then waived all rights to contest the location 
of the highway and was only entitled to seek compensation for 
the taking and resulting damages. This, however, is due to 
the fact that the law so provides, (78-34-9) Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, and not because appellant was requested to abandon a legal 
right. (2) If appellant's assertion is correct, to wit, that 
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it "gave up certain rights," then the consideration only runs 
one way since respondent has never asserted or considered 
that it "gave up anything" in the events leading up to the 
entry of the Order. (3) How much benefit, if any, did re-
spondent receive? The answer is, virtually nothing; the re-
spondent was excused from having to serve process on defend-
ants residing outside the State. The law, however, in Sec-
tion 78-34-9, would have allowed the State to serve notice 
on the clerk of the court and proceed with a hearing after 
the minimum notice period. Realistically, it is submitted 
that this is hardly adequate consideration for an agreement 
with the legal consequences which appellant asserts. 
POINT III 
IF A CONTRACT WAS "CREATED" BY THE ORDER, IT IS 
INCOMPLETE AND APPELLANT'S RELIEF WOULD BE LIMITED AND 
MAY HAVE BEEN WAIVED. 
A. THE ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY IS INCOMPLETE 
REGARDING RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF THE ORDER AND 
THE AWARD OF MONEY DAMAGES URGED BY APPELLANT 
IS NOT PROPER. 
Assuming for purpose of argument, that a contract was 
"created" on June 7, 1971, by the events surrounding the entry 
of the Order of Immediate Occupancy, then the contract is the 
Order itself. 
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The Order or "contract" does not provide for an award 
of money damages in the event it is not complied with by its 
terms. 
The Order of Occupancy, itself, provides for injunctive 
relief and this is all the relief that plaintiff is entitled 
to. The court may award damages under a contempt proceeding* 
Section 78-32-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads as follows: 
"If an actual loss or in-
jury to a party in an action 
or special proceeding, preju-
dicial to his rights therein, 
is caused by the contempt, the 
court, in addition to the fine 
or imprisonment imposed for the 
contempt or in place thereof, 
may order the person proceeded 
against to pay the party aggrieved 
a sum of money sufficient to in-
demnify him and to satisfy his 
costs and expenses; which order 
and the acceptance of money under 
it is a bar to an action by the 
aggrieved party for such loss 
and injury*" 
It would appear from the foregoing Section that the 
court would be the one to make inquiry as to whether or not 
there was a contempt within the purview of the Order of Oc-
cupancy and if so, award damages if it so determined, how-
ever, it would appear that this proceeding would be improper 
before a jury. 
The Order of Immediate Occupancy is further deficient 
as a "contract" in that no time limits are set regarding when 
actions must be completed. 
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B. APPELLANT'S RELIEF, IF ANY, WAS INJUNCTIVE IN 
NATURE AND WAS WAIVED BY FAILURE TO INSIST ON 
ENFORCEMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED INJURY. 
Assuming further for the sake of argument that in 
addition to the formation of a contract by the events of 
June 7, 1971, the respondent breached the contract, then 
pursuant to the terms of the agreement the relief was in-
junctive in nature. 
In analyzing this problem the question arises, when 
did the breach occur if it, in fact, occurred? The answer 
is, sometime after August of 1971, when construction com-
menced and July of 1972, when the frontage road was com-
pleted? (R. 60) Since appellant elected to seek relief 
from this "alleged breach" by contacting the Governor and 
the Director of the then Department of Highways, rather than 
seeking injunctive relief as the "agreement" (alleged) pro-
vided, they waived any possible right they had for injunc-
tive relief. It is true that an injunction was sought in 
October of 1972, when appellant filed an Order to Show 
Cause. (R.94, 95) By stipulation the parties agreed that 
the allegations raised therein could be heard independently 
at a future time. (R. 96, 97) This is not an admission by 
respondent that any rights, in fact, existed. 
Respondent submits that the failure of appellant to 
request injunctive relief at the time of the alleged breach 
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is in effect a waiver of any right to the protection or re-
lief afforded by a finding of contempt by a court. A sub-
sequent determination by the court that the Order of Im-
mediate Occupancy was breached at a previous time does not 
entitle the court to award appellant damages when the appro-
priate relief at the time of the injury would have been to 
issue an Order to respondent requiring compliance with the 
previously issued Order of Immediate Occupancy. Only the 
continued non-compliance of respondent to the court's specific 
directive would give rise to an award of money damages. 
The appellant alleges it was damaged on November 11, 1971, 
when its insurance was canceled allegedly because of access 
problems. (R. 22) The fact that nothing was done until October/ 
1972, when the Order to Show Cause was filed, raises serious 
question as to the truth or validity of appellant's allegations 
regarding damages. The fact is the appellant should be estop-
ped from asserting any claim for injunctive relief simply be-
cause of this unreasonable delay in enforcing its alleged rights 
and without a right to secure injunctive relief, damages ob-
viously cannot be awarded. 
It is stated in 42 Am. Jur.2d 1108, Section 307 under 
the title "injunctions" as follows: 
" . . . It has been held, however, 
that after the need for injunctive 
relief has ceased, the court cannot 
retain, for the assessment of dam-
ages, an action to enjoin the con-
tinuance of trespasses and to abate 
a nuisance causing substantial dam-
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. age, where the defendant would not 
be liable for such damages in an 
action at law." (Citing Hennessy v. 
Boston, 26 Mass. 559, 164 N.E. 470 
62 A.L.R. 780) 
It is submitted that the same rule should apply in 
this case and that the appellant should not be permitted to 
recover damages under an injunctive action filed after the 
work is completed when the law would not permit him to recover 
in an action at law. - ' 
'•- C. RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE TO APPELLANT IN ANY 
EVENT SINCE UNDER PRINCIPLES OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
LAW TEMPORARY IMPAIRMENT OF ACCESS IS NOT COM-
PENSIBLE. , ..;•.,:;: . •• 
In the eminent domain proceeding involving these par-
ties, the respondent acknowledges the obligation it had to 
provide appellant with "reasonable access." It is, however, 
unrealistic to assume that with the amount of construction re-
quired that there would not be periods of time when the access 
would be impaired or somewhat temporary in nature. Respondent 
and its contractor made every reasonable effort to maintain 
the access particularly in the early months of the project 
prior to the time appellant closed its restaurant facility 
and elected not to open its winter operation. (R. 52) (The 
restaurant closed when the contractor terminated its opera-
tions in the Fall of 1971.) 
The law recognizes the fact that some temporary injury 
may result, but that it is generally not compensable, for in-
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stance, the California Supreme Court in the case of People 
v. Ayon, 352 P.2d 519 (California I960), stated the general 
rule regarding this issue and some of the policy reasons for 
the rule: 
"Temporary injury resulting 
from actual construction of public 
improvements is generally non com-
pensable. Personal inconvenience, 
annoyance or discomfort in the use 
of property are not actionable types 
of injuries. It would unduly hinder 
and delay or even prevent the con-
struction of public improvements to 
hold compensable every item of incon-
venience or interference attendant 
upon the ownership of private real 
property because of the presence 
of machinery, materials and supplies 
necessary for the public work which 
have been placed on streets adjacent 
to the improvement." 
(Page 525) 
It should be noted that in the Ayon case there was a 
taking of a portion of defendant's property and the defendants 
were attempting to recover additional damages as a result of 
inconvenience during construction. 
Other cases which have generally reached the same con-
clusion are the following: 
Commonwealth Department of Highways 
v. Ray, 392 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1965) 
Rymkevitch v. State, 249 N.Y.S. 2d 
514 (Court of Claims 1964) 
Frankline Gas Company v. O'Brien, 171 
N.E.2d 45 (111. 1961), wherein the court 
stated the following: 
" . . . defendant's witnesses con-
ceed that the interference is tempor-
-25-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ary and, this being so, would 
not have the effect of perma-
nently depreciating the value 
of the land not taken. It has 
. long been settled that tempor-
ary consequential interference 
with the use of property oc-
casioned by the construction of 
a public improvement is not a 
proper element of damage." 
Other cases are: 
- Liebarger v. State Department of 
Roads, 128 N.W.2d 132 (Neb. 1964) 
Masheter v. Yate, 224 N.E.2d 540 
(Ohio 1967) 
In effect, plaintiff is seeking to recover damages 
under his "contract theory" when the law would otherwise deny 
him recovery. Most of the cases which have been decided in 
this area recognize that often there are very real and sub-
stantial damages and Nichols on Eminent Domain states the 
following: 
"This rule is hard to 
defend on principle. But the < 
impossibility of constructing 
a subway or sewer or laying a 
water pipe in the streets of 
the business section of a city 
without in some degree inter-
fering with access to abutting ( 
property, and the consequent 
danger of a multiplicity of 
suits from the determination 
of which it might be impossible 
as a practical matter to ex-
clude mere damage to business, ^ 
have led the courts to reject 
claims of this character as a 
matter of public necessity." 
(2-a Nichols Eminent Domain Sec-
tion 6.4442(2) revised 3rd Edition 
1975) * 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
AS TO OTHER MATTERS. 
A. RESPONDENT'S WRONGFUL ACTS, IF ANY, DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF IMMUNITY UNDER THE 
SECTION OF THE ACT WHICH DEALS WITH UNSAFE 
OR DANGEROUS HIGHWAYS. 
Appellant's second count in its Complaint alleged 
that respondent, Road Commission, created a "defective, un-
safe and dangerous condition of a highway, structure and other 
public improvemt" all to the plaintiff's damage, it relies on 
Section 63-30-8, and language therein as authority for the 
non-application of governmental immunity* 
Respondent submits that the court correctly dismissed 
this count along with the contractual theory urged by appel-
lant. Respondent submits that the record has several refer-
ences in it to inadequate "commercial access" according to 
appellants. (R. 48 - R. 50). Even respondents Director, 
Blaine J. Kay, recognized this problem and directed corrective 
action on November 10, 1971. (R. 51) This corrective action 
was completed on November 15, 1971. (R. 60) Appellants do 
not spell out what the "defective, unsafe or dangerous con-
dition" is which the State has allegedly created. 
In any event, at the time appellant originated the Order 
to Show Cause against respondent for alleged failure to comply 
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with the Order of Immediate Occupancy, the access was com-
pleted and obviously complied with the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy. If appellant means the lack of deceleration lanes, 
left turn storage lane and other things relating to the high-
way itself which he requested, it is respectfully submitted 
that appellant knew when he wrote his letters of March 23, 
1971, (R. 36-38) and May 29, 1971, (R. 39, 40) what would be 
constructed and how traffic would be handled and that these 
requests could not be accommodated. The record reveals that 
while there may have been temporary problems during the construc-
tion of the frontage road prior to its use as a detour, there 
is no showing that the completed frontage road, or accesses to 
appellant's property were "defective, unsafe or a dangerous 
condition. " . :^-:/:?v ~ ^ ••'-, 
Furthermore, if the damage which appellant allegedly 
sustained is due to impairment of access, this is not compen-
sable. (See statement from People v. Ayon, Supra, Page 24.) « 
It is respectfully submitted that if there are damages 
as a result of the access questions, they originate from al-
legedly inadequate access for a commercial enterprise which ( 
is reliant on convenience. They are not the result of a 
"defective, unsafe or dangerous condition." If the condition 
ever, in fact, did exist, it was the result of a temporary i 
condition which was unavoidable and which was adequately cor-
rected on November 15, 1971. This temporary situation was 
one not unique to appellant, but was suffered by other prop- * 
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erty owners in the vicinity. The courts have held as a 
general rule that damage suffered by a property owner must 
be special and unique to him and not a damage or inconven-
ience suffered by all residents in the area. In the case of 
Liebarger v. State Department of Roads, 128 N.W.2d 132 (Neb. 
1964), the court stated: 
"In the present cause the 
plaintiffs seek to recover for 
the temporary presence of road 
working machinery and rubble 
which is to take place after 
condemnation the land of the 
State and which arises during 
the construction of the improve-
ment only. The locality in which 
this highway is to go is shown by 
plats and aerial photographs here-
in to be in the thickly populated 
urban area. The temporary incon-
venience complained of is one 
common to all residents and occu-
pants of the vicinity. Evidence 
of such elements of damages borne 
in common by the neighborhood should 
not be admitted upon retrial." 
(Emphasis added) 
Another court has summed up the lav; on this point in 
the case of Masheter v. Yake, 224 N.E.2d 540 at 543 (Ohio 
1967), wherein the court states the following: 
"Unless unduly prolonged, 
mere elements of annoyance, 
noise, inconvenience and inter-
ference of temporary duration 
during the construction of an 
improvement and common to the 
public are not recoverable as 
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damages in an appropriation 
action. (Citations omitted) 
Not being permanent in nature 
they do not last beyond the 
completion of the improvement, 
have no effect on the market 
value of the property before 
the improvement, and have no 
effect upon the market value 
of the residue thereafter, 
which market values provide 
the outside limits of recovery." 
As this court well knows, loss of business profits 
are not compensable in an eminent domain proceeding. Like-
wise certain items of damage are not compensable in a condemna-
tion case. The court in Kentucky had the following comment 
in the case of Commonwealth Department of Highways v. Rayf 392 
S.W.2d 666 (Ky. 1965): 
it 
. . . 
To reach the heart of the 
problem, we can catalogue 
items of damage to which 
the landowner is not entitled. 
The interference with the < 
owner's resulting from the 
reasonable construction opera-
tions, is not a compensable 
item." (Emphasis added) 
Appellant was paid in excess of $211,000/ in the condemna-
tion action. (R. 61) This included compensation for land, im-
provements and damages. He now is seeking a way around govern-
mental immunity to recover damages in areas which he could not 
recover for under eminent domain, to wit, "interference from 
reasonable construction operations/" "temporary impairment of
 g 
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access" and "loss of business profits." This is so evident 
on its fact that the court quite properly dismissed this 
count of plaintiff1s Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of 
the trial court to grant respondent's Motion to Dismiss was 
and is correct. The respondent, State Road Commission, is 
not bound by unauthorized acts of its employees or agents. 
The State's sovereign immunity is waived in certain defined 
instances pursuant to the act of the legislature, and the 
Attorney General cannot waive this protection. It cannot 
be waived other than by the provisions of the act. The 
respondent did not act to waive sovereign immunity and no 
request was made by its attorney to waive the act or to ob-
tain permission to bind the respondent to an agreement or 
"contract." It is further submitted that an agreement be-
tween counsel as to the language of a proposed Order to be 
submitted to the court for review and for incorporation in 
an Order of the court does not create a "contract." It is 
also respectfully submitted that if the actions of respond-
ent's counsel did create a contract, then the consideration 
is inadequate to support the so called contract. Finally, 
it is submitted that the access which existed and which now 
exists across appellant's property is adequate and at no time 
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could be construed as a "dangerous or defective11 condition 
within the meaning and intent of the governmental immunity 
act sufficient to remove the protection of sovereign immun-
ity. For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the decision of the trial court should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
FORD 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
-32-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
SEP 15 1978 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSIW 
J. Reuben Clark Law SCIKMI 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
